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The views expressed in the contributions to this Monitor are entirely the 
authors’ own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy 
or of the G20 Studies Centre.
The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international 
policy debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is 
not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to:
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international 
debate.
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing 
an accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, 
dialogues and conferences.
Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy has been provided by the Australian Government.
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OVERVIEW
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
This issue of the Monitor contains reflections on Think20 2014. The 
Think20 involves think tanks and academics from G20 countries. The 
aim of the Think20 is to feed policy ideas into the G20 process.
The first Think20 meeting to be held under Australia’s G20 presidency 
was hosted by the Lowy Institute in Sydney, 11 December 2013. 
There were over 40 participants from G20 countries. In advance of 
the meeting, participants provided a short paper outlining their policy 
recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit. These papers have 
been published and are also available online.2 
Following are papers prepared by myself, Daniela Strube and Hugh 
Jorgensen covering the four policy areas covered at the Think20 
meeting on 11 December 2013. The papers deal with:
• The G20’s economic and finance challenges
• Trade liberalisation
•  Infrastructure 
•  Development
The papers are not a summary of the meeting nor do they reflect the 
agreed views of participants. They reflect the authors’ views on the four 
topics listed above, and on the ideas raised within the Think20 papers 
and the discussion at the meeting. Each paper focuses on specific 
policy proposals that could be advanced by the G20 in 2014.
Each paper focuses 
on specific policy 
proposals that could 
be advanced by the 
G20 in 2014.
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy.
2 Think20 Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike 
Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013); 
The papers are also available online at: www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/think20-
papers-2014-G20.
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THE G20’S ECONOMIC AND 
FINANCE CHALLENGES
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
INTRODUCTION
The G20 leaders’ process was established in November 2008 in 
response to a global financial and economic crisis. In an effort to prevent 
similar, future crises, G20 leaders set about the task of stabilising the 
global economy, restoring growth, and initiating a process to strengthen 
financial regulation. 
Although these objectives remain ‘work in progress’, the achievements of 
the G20 in responding to the crisis need to be recognised, including the 
provision of: coordinated liquidity injections, international resources for 
crisis countries, coordinated fiscal stimulus measures, and action to deal 
with failures in financial regulation.2 But five years after the crisis, global 
growth is still weak and the risks are on the downside. The post-crisis 
global recovery remains ‘arduous and protracted’, and global production 
has yet to return to pre-crisis levels.3 Unemployment remains high in many 
countries and wealth and income inequality is increasing. It is estimated 
that over 22 million jobs have been lost globally since the beginning of the 
crisis, and that 600 million jobs need to be created over the next fifteen 
years to sustain current employment levels.4  Evidently, lifting economic 
growth and creating jobs must remain the priority of the G20.
CONCERNS OVER THE POLICY MIX
Adding to the uncertainties that confront the global economy are the 
questions about the appropriateness and sustainability of the suite of 
macroeconomic policy tools that have been utilised in the wake of the 
financial crisis. Economic policy is in uncharted waters. There has been 
ongoing debate around the use of fiscal policy as a growth booster versus 
the need to consolidate fiscal positions and reduce public debt levels. 
A tendency towards fiscal consolidation has contributed to the adoption 
of unorthodox monetary policies and substantial quantitative easing. 
This has resulted in substantial spillover impacts, particularly through 
attempts – even if indirect – to boost export-led growth via currency 
depreciation.5 As with all monetary policy, the effects of quantitative 
Evidently, lifting 
economic growth 
and creating jobs 
must remain the 
priority of the G20.
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy
2 Stephen Pickford, “G20 Economic Priorities for 2014: Reforming the MAP,” in Think20 
Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan 
and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
3 Guven Sak, “A More Inclusive G20 Economic Policy Coordination Mechanism Is Possible,” ibid.
4 World Bank, World Development Report 2013: Jobs (Washington: World Bank, 2012).
5 David Vines, “The G20 MAP, Fiscal Austerity and Financing for Investment,” in Think20 
Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan 
and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
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easing will be temporary, but as it also places a renewed emphasis on 
risk taking, it increases the potential vulnerability of many economies.6 
INCREASED CAPITAL VOLATILITY
A major concern confronting many economies, particularly emerging 
markets, is increased capital volatility due to the unwinding of 
quantitative easing in a number of advanced economies. Shoring 
up the mechanisms that deal with such volatility, such as improving 
the adequacy of safety nets, both global and regional, needs to be 
on the G20’s agenda.7 While the resources of the IMF have been 
increased, there remain concerns over its governance structure and 
the appropriateness of its response to the European debt crisis. 
Regional financial arrangements, including bilateral currency swaps, 
are proliferating. Resolving how the resources of the IMF can best be 
combined with regional funding arrangements in responding to capital 
volatility would also boost global economic resilience.
The G20 has struggled to deliver a clear, consistent and coordinated 
message as to how members are cooperating to restore growth and 
create jobs.8 The leaders’ declaration and action plan released at the 
St Petersburg Summit did acknowledge the challenges and risks to the 
global economy, and leaders said that they would address them. But their 
action plan largely consisted of a list of policies already announced or 
already being implemented by members.9 Moreover, the United States 
did not mention its monetary and exchange rate policies in its submission 
to the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) outlined in St Petersburg – 
both major factors in the trajectory of the global recovery.10  Given that 
international cooperation is essential and goes to the heart of the G20 
process,11 members have to get back on the same page and demonstrate 
that the G20 truly is an effective forum for dealing with international 
economic issues and fostering cooperation. In particular, the G20 must 
develop a clearer, more consistent narrative about how members are 
cooperating to strengthen global economic growth and create jobs.12 
That being said, the reality is that each country’s policies are ultimately 
set according to its individual national circumstances and interests.13 
...the G20 must develop 
a clearer, more consistent 
narrative about how 
members are cooperating 
to strengthen global 
economic growth and 
create jobs.
6 Ibid.
7 Ye Yu, “G20 Economic Priorities for 2014: Reforming the MAP,” ibid.
8 Mike Callaghan, “The Brisbane Summit Needs to Deliver a G20 Coordinated Growth 
Strategy,” ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ye Yu, “G20 Economic Priorities for 2014: Reforming the MAP.”
11 Jose Siaba Serrate, “The Threats of Transition, and the Need to Speed Up the Building 
of a Robust Market Infrastructure,” in Think20 Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations 
for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2013).
12 Mike Callaghan, “Strengthening the Core of the G20: Clearer Objectives, Better 
Communication, Greater Transparency and Accountability,” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2013).
13 Serrate, “The Threats of Transition, and the Need to Speed Up the Building of a Robust 
Market Infrastructure.” 
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THE MAP IS A WORK IN PROGRESS
The G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth 
– supported by the MAP – is meant to be the basis by which G20 
members analyse national economic policies and their spillover effects 
on other countries and on global growth, with the goal of formulating 
adjustment commitments.14 The success of the Framework and MAP is 
therefore closely connected to the success of the G20 as a whole.15 Yet 
the MAP, like the G20’s task of strengthening global growth, can best 
be described as ‘work in progress’. 
However, while the Framework and the MAP should be at the core 
of the G20 process, a range of views as to the intent and purpose of 
both the Framework and MAP exist. Proposed objectives for the MAP 
include: establishing a mechanism for reducing global imbalances;16 
shifting the balance of global demand growth;17 managing medium-term 
fiscal consolidation;18  bringing structure into the consultation process in 
a complex and integrated global economy;19 strengthening international 
cooperation in the making of macroeconomic policy;20 and, providing a 
means to enhance cooperation between the major economies.21 
The widely acknowledged strength of the Framework’s MAP, is that it is 
‘owned’ by G20 members, bolstered by high-quality technical input from 
the International Financial Institutions.22 Its weakness, which it shares 
with other attempts at economic surveillance, is that the MAP has no 
enforcement power over a member other than the potential public 
embarrassment of being criticised by other G20 members for failing to 
implement its commitments. However, with agreements reached on a 
consensus basis, and a tendency to favour ‘peer protection’ over peer 
review, the scope for public embarrassment of G20 members as part of 
the MAP has, in practice, been minimal. 
The acid test of the MAP and the associated action plans that have 
been released at each G20 summit is whether they are influencing the 
policy choices of G20 members. The concept of countries listing specific 
policy measures in their action plans and the idea of peer review to 
assess implementation was well intentioned, but is it working? 
The acid test of the MAP 
and the associated action 
plans that have been 
released at each G20 
summit is whether they 
are influencing the policy 
choices of G20 members.
14 Stephen Pickford, “G20 Economic Priorities for 2014: Reforming the MAP.”
15 Katharina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker, “Strengthening the Peer Review of the G20 
Mutual Assessment Process,” in Think20 Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the 
Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, 2013).
16 Colin Bradford, “Global Rebalancing, Financial Risk Assessment and the G20,” ibid; 
Gnath and Schmucker, “Strengthening the Peer Review of the G20 Mutual Assessment 
Process.”
17 Stephen Pickford, “G20 Economic Priorities for 2014: Reforming the MAP.” 
18 Ibid.
19 Guven Sak, “A More Inclusive G20 Economic Policy Coordination Mechanism Is Possible.”
20 David Vines, “The G20 MAP, Fiscal Austerity and Financing for Investment.”
21 Ye Yu, “G20 Economic Priorities for 2014: Reforming the MAP.”
22 Katharina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker, “Strengthening the Peer Review of the G20 
Mutual Assessment Process.”
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THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL REGULATION
A very large financial regulatory reform agenda is notionally underway. 
However, as the crisis was essentially a North Atlantic financial 
crisis, the G20’s work on strengthening financial regulation has been 
described as a process by which non-G7 countries were asked to 
introduce reforms that addressed the financial regulatory weaknesses 
of the G7 economies.23 In other words, in re-regulating their own 
financial systems, the G7 asked the rest of the world to do the same, 
even though other countries had not necessarily been as ‘hands-off’ as 
the G7 in terms of their approach to financial regulation and supervision 
prior to the crisis. There has been progress in establishing new financial 
standards, but gaps remain and implementation has been patchy. For 
example, a weakness of Basel III is its maintenance of the internal 
ratings-based approach, which allows banks to use differing methods of 
risk-weighting assets in determining their required amount of regulatory 
capital. For example, the average amount of risk-weighted assets as a 
percentage of total assets among large EU banks is 33 per cent, while 
the US average is about 58 per cent, meaning that the other assets 
require no capital.24 While the capital position of most banks has been 
improved since the crisis, the question remains whether the current 
approach will be effective in delivering both a stable, transparent, and 
efficient banking system. In a similar vein, with the rules on over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives trading and clearing still to be implemented, 
there are deep concerns over the consistency of their implementation 
across jurisdictions, as it remains too early to assess the effectiveness 
and appropriateness of these reforms.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
For the G20 to remain relevant and to draw on its strengths, the Brisbane 
Summit should address the main issues confronting the global economy 
and concentrate on the areas requiring international cooperation. 
The economic/finance policy options that could be pursued at the 
Brisbane Summit can be divided into three, interconnected categories:
•  Measures to lift growth
•  Dealing with risks and vulnerabilities
•  Strengthening the MAP process
THE NEED FOR A G20 GROWTH STRATEGY
The development of a combined G20 growth strategy, which outlines 
how G20 members are working together to lift growth, along with 
23 Karel Lannoo, “The G20 Five Years On,” in Think20 Papers 2014: Policy 
Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and Hugh 
Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
24  Ibid.
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the release of each member’s individual growth strategy, should be 
elevated as top priorities for Brisbane. In the St Petersburg declaration, 
leaders requested their finance ministers develop comprehensive 
growth strategies for presentation at the Brisbane Summit. The growth 
strategies represent an opportunity for the G20 to deliver a consistent 
and coordinated economic narrative, to reposition the Framework for 
Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth at the centre of the G20’s 
activities, and demonstrate that all of the G20’s work is directed towards 
lifting growth.The coordinated growth strategy should also demonstrate 
that G20 members are aware that their policy choices can impact on 
the prospects of other countries – both positively and negatively – and 
that they will act accordingly.
The growth strategy should be comprehensive and embrace all aspects 
of economic policy and not be seen as primarily focused on fiscal 
consolidation or reducing external imbalances. The strategy should 
also reflect the differing circumstances of individual G20 economies. 
For example, much attention has been directed towards the role that 
increased infrastructure spending can play in lifting growth.25 Increased 
infrastructure spending has an important role to play in the recovery 
of some countries, while in others, the priority is not so much to lift 
investment, but to stimulate private consumption expenditure.26 The 
growth strategies should also cover the importance of ensuring 
macroeconomic stability through appropriately targeted monetary and 
fiscal policies, keeping markets open, facilitating private investment, 
liberalising trade, along with promoting efficient product and labour 
markets, which includes appropriately targeted education and skills 
programs. The growth strategies should incorporate the importance of 
empowering small and medium-sized businesses, recognising their role 
in creating jobs.27 Reducing social and economic inequalities should 
also be a core component of the G20’s bid to promote balanced and 
sustainable growth, as should efforts at lifting the growth prospects of 
developing economies. 
The importance of efficient and stable financial markets ought to be 
recognised as a central component of achieving sustainable growth.28 
With this in mind, the growth strategy launched at the Brisbane Summit 
should include steps that improve the G20’s oversight of financial 
regulation. As the detailed development of new financial standards is 
being undertaken through the standard-setting bodies and the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), the G20 should focus on the ‘big-picture’ issues, 
including taking stock of the overall progress made on achieving stable 
and efficient financial systems.29 It should also assess whether the 
new standards are being implemented consistently, and whether they 
The development of a 
combined G20 growth 
strategy, which outlines 
how G20 members are 
working together to lift 
growth, along with the 
release of each member’s 
individual growth strategy, 
should be elevated as top 
priorities for Brisbane.
25 David Vines, “The G20 MAP, Fiscal Austerity and Financing for Investment.” 
26 Such as China.
27 Sak, “A More Inclusive G20 Economic Policy Coordination Mechanism Is Possible.”
28 Colin Bradford, “Global Rebalancing, Financial Risk Assessment and the G20.”
29 Mike Callaghan, “The Brisbane Summit Needs to Deliver a G20 Coordinated Growth Strategy.”
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are leading to any unintended consequences, particularly with respect 
to emerging markets and developing countries. The importance of 
ensuring the FSB has a balanced agenda that includes financial market 
regulation also needs to be acknowledged, as the FSB has tended to 
focus more on bank regulation.
An important component of the comprehensive growth strategy will be 
combating tax avoidance and evasion, particularly ‘base erosion and 
profit shifting’ by corporates. Declining tax revenues are a problem for 
governments at a time when many are fiscally constrained. Tax evasion 
and avoidance also raise domestic political concerns about fairness. 
The position of developing countries has to be specifically recognised, 
because improving their ability to raise taxes is critical to their growth 
prospects.
DEALING WITH RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES
As part of the task of lifting growth on a sustainable basis, the G20 
must be responsive to all risks and vulnerabilities threatening the global 
economy and take appropriate action. As such, there have been calls for 
the G20 to establish an early warning system to detect potential threats 
in advance.30 Currently the G20 MAP concentrates on developments in 
the real economy. The IMF, with support from the FSB, has the lead in 
evaluating global financial risk and providing an early warning system 
for signalling vulnerabilities. However the IMF’s analysis of the financial 
sector and its assessment of vulnerabilities is not directly discussed 
by G20 finance ministers and central bank governors or leaders. As 
such, rather than the G20 attempting to implement its own early alert or 
vulnerability exercise, there is a need to improve the interaction between 
IMF surveillance and the G20. The G20 has to be more supportive and 
responsive to all aspects of IMF and FSB surveillance, particularly the 
identification of vulnerabilities and systemic risks.
As part of better integrating the MAP with IMF surveillance, the G20’s 
work program should explicitly address the highest priority issues 
raised in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) report.31 For 
example, the October 2013 WEO identified that the priority issues 
needing to be addressed included the speed of fiscal consolidation, 
completing the process of repairing financial institutions’ balance 
sheets, and managing the volatility of capital flows. These issues 
should be directly addressed in the development of the G20’s growth 
strategies. As mentioned earlier, the adequacy of financial safety nets 
in dealing with capital volatility needs to be examined by the G20 in 
2014, including the relationship between the IMF with regional safety 
nets. The role of bilateral central swap lines should also be considered, 
30 Jose Siaba Serrate, “The Threats of Transition, and the Need to Speed up the Building 
of a Robust Market Infrastructure.”
31 Stephen Pickford, “G20 Economic Priorities for 2014: Reforming the MAP.”
The G20 has to be 
more supportive and 
responsive to all 
aspects of IMF and FSB 
surveillance, particularly 
the identification of 
vulnerabilities and 
systemic risks.
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along with examining the possibility of endorsing a set of principles for 
such swaps.32 
STRENGTHENING THE MAP
There are a number of approaches that could be taken in an effort to 
strengthen the MAP. The current approach of encouraging countries to 
commit to implementing specific structural reforms could be extended, 
along with the peer review process as part of the activities of the 
Framework Working Group. Countries could be requested to provide 
more specific reform commitments with implementation timetables that 
could be monitored as part of the MAP.33 To date, countries have largely 
only identified already announced policies that are being implemented, 
and it is difficult to see how the G20 MAP process has contributed to 
influencing members’ policy choices. 
An alternative to using the MAP to monitor the detail of structural 
reforms is to elevate the nature of the discussion within the G20, such 
that an examination of the spillovers and appropriateness of the chosen 
policy mix within each country’s overall growth strategy becomes the 
focus of the discussion.
At a minimum, the documentation released as part of the MAP needs 
to be streamlined. Longer and more detailed reports and annexes do 
not necessarily enhance the effectiveness of the MAP. The results of the 
MAP should be presented in a single, targeted, and coherent document.34
Another option for strengthening the MAP would be to seek the input 
of external, independent experts (other than the IFIs). However this 
would reduce the ownership of the MAP, which is meant to be one of its 
strengths, and likely reduce the willingness of members to meaningfully 
participate in the process. Public pressure is perhaps the most important 
motivating mechanism for enforcing commitments made as part of 
the MAP. To the extent that the G20 increases its transparency and 
publishes the reports from the Framework Working Group in advance 
of the summit, this will allow for external review before leaders discuss 
the reports.
FINAL COMMENT – G20 LEADERS NEED VISION
The world needs leadership and leaders need vision.35 G20 leaders 
should be preparing for the challenges of tomorrow as well as meeting 
the demands of today. Leaders should look to the future and assess how 
technological advancements, the digital economy, and the changing 
32 Christophe Destais, “The International Monetary System as a Swap Nexus,” in Think20 
Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan 
and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
33 Katharina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker, “Strengthening the Peer Review of the G20 
Mutual Assessment Process.”
34 Ibid.
35 Mike Callaghan, “Introducing a Forward-Looking Component to the G20 Leaders’ Agenda.”.
Public pressure is 
perhaps the most 
important motivating 
mechanism for enforcing 
commitments made as 
part of the MAP. 
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nature of global business practices are not only challenging tax laws 
and the regulation of globally operating financial firms, but also trade 
policy and many aspects of economic and social policies. Technological 
change will not stop – it will lead to greater interconnectedness and 
the need for closer cooperation between countries. Engagement in 
the ‘vision thing’ will reinforce the need for the G20 to be an effective 
forum for international economic cooperation, as well as emphasise the 
importance of having effective international economic institutions.
13
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THE G20 AND TRADE 
LIBERALISATION
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
INTRODUCTION
The papers prepared for the Think20 meeting held on 11 December 
2013 were written in advance of the WTO ministerial meeting in 
Bali on 6-7 December 2013. Many of the participants were sceptical 
as to whether an agreement would be reached in Bali, although all 
emphasised the importance of an open, rules-based multilateral trading 
system to support global growth.
The fact that an agreement was reached at the Bali WTO ministerial 
meeting was a very welcome development. It is the first multilateral trade 
agreement to have been reached by the WTO since it was established 
in 1995, and comes after 12 years of protracted negotiations over the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) that commenced in 2001. Even if the 
outcome from Bali was but a small component of the range of issues 
within the DDA, the Bali WTO deal demonstrated that the WTO can be 
a forum for negotiating multilateral trade agreements.
Notwithstanding the agreement in Bali, the future of the multilateral 
trading system is a pressing issue for the international community, and 
it must be a key priority for the G20 in 2014. 
CHALLENGES
Trade and investment play a critical role in promoting economic growth. 
G20 leaders have acknowledged this, although their involvement in 
global trade issues has largely been limited to the annual inclusion 
of a ‘standstill’ clause in each leader’s communiqué, where G20 
members commit to avoid introducing new protectionist measures. 
While G20 leaders have repeatedly indicated their support for the 
successful completion of the Doha Round, the G20’s impact on the 
DDA has been very limited, if it has had any impact at all. Nevertheless, 
at the St Petersburg Summit, G20 leaders agreed to make ‘significant 
contributions’ to make the Bali negotiations a success. It is difficult 
to determine, however, to what extent this statement by G20 leaders 
contributed to the successful outcome at the Bali meeting.
IMPACT OF THE STANDSTILL AGAINST PROTECTIONIST 
MEASURES
The standstill against protectionist pressures, which was first introduced 
at the Washington G20 leaders’ meeting in November 2008, and has 
1  Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy.
...the future of the 
multilateral trading 
system is a pressing 
issue for the international 
community, and it must 
be a key priority for the 
G20 in 2014. 
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since been extended at subsequent summits – the latest was the 
extension at the St Petersburg Summit to end 2016 – has generally 
been considered as one of the more significant outcomes from the 
G20 process. However the performance of G20 members in honouring 
the pledge against introducing new protectionist measures has been 
patchy.2 The latest report by the WTO on G20 trade measures notes 
that between mid-May 2013 and mid-November 2013, 116 new trade-
restrictive measures were identified.3 The new measures affect around 
1.1 per cent of G20 merchandise imports and the WTO says that 
protectionism is on the rise. The total amount of G20 trade subject 
to restrictive measures is accumulating because, notwithstanding a 
commitment by G20 members to remove trade restrictions put in place 
since the crisis, the WTO reports that only around 20 per cent of the 
total number of trade-restrictive measures taken since October 2008 
have been removed.4 
The trade-restrictive or distorting effects of behind-the-border measures 
– such as subsidies, public procurement, and goods and services 
regulations – are more difficult to measure and are not covered in the WTO 
report on G20 trade measures.5 The Global Trade Alert (GTA) project, 
headed by Simon Evenett, has issued 14 reports monitoring overall 
protectionist pressures since 2009. The GTA defines protectionism as 
anything that hurts another country’s commercial interest. According to 
the GTA, at least 400 ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies have been put in 
place each year since 2009, and that trend is on the rise.6 Moreover, in 
terms of the success of the G20’s standstill on protectionist pressures, 
Evenett reports that “what is striking is that, on all but one criteria, the 
performance of the G20 members is not markedly better than the next 
10 mid-sized trading nations”.7
TREND TOWARDS REGIONAL TRADING AGREEMENTS
The multilateral trading system remains the strongest force for 
economic growth and the best defence against distorting protectionism. 
For decades, developing countries have benefited from progressive 
trade liberalisation driven by developed economies.8 However, the 
2 Shinichi Kitajima, “Toward More Open International Trade: The G20’s Responsibility,” in 
Think20 Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike 
Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
3 WTO OMC, “Report on G20 Trade Measures (Mid-May 2013 to Mid-November 2013),” 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/g20_wto_report_dec13_e.pdf.
4 Ibid.
5 Alan S. Alexandroff, “The Fear of Fragmentation,” in Think20 Papers 2014: Policy 
Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and Hugh 
Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
6 Simon J. Evenett, What Restraint? Five Years of G20 Pledges on Trade, The 14th GTA 
Report (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2013).
7 Alan S. Alexandroff, “The Fear of Fragmentation.”
8 Andres Rozental, “Near Future for International Trade: Who’s Behind the Wheel − the 
WTO or Regional Trade Agreements?,” in Think20 Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations 
for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2013).
The multilateral trading 
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protracted nature of the DDA multilateral trade negotiations has 
seen trade liberalisation being pursued more through bilateral and 
regional trade arrangements. And there is growing concern that the 
move towards mega-regional trade agreements – such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) – will see trade rules become increasingly 
Balkanised and unequal, with confusing sets of rules of origin, differing 
treatment of international property rights, and variable arrangements 
for dealing with state-owned enterprises.9 There is also a concern that 
these regional agreements will substantially distract the parties involved 
from pursuing multilateral trade liberalisation and will further alienate 
developing countries not included in the mega-regional processes.10 
Protagonists for the regional agreements argue, however, that they 
constitute ‘competitive liberalisation’ and can serve as building blocks 
for wider trade liberalisation.11 
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BALI TRADE DEAL?
As noted, the WTO trade deal agreed in Bali on 7 December 2013 was 
very welcome. If no agreement had been reached, the credibility of 
the WTO as a forum for trade liberalisation would have taken a mortal 
blow. But the Bali deal was ‘Doha lite’. It involved elements of the Doha 
Round where it was thought a deal could be readily achieved. The main 
achievement was the trade facilitation agreement (reducing the cost of 
moving goods through customs borders). But will the Bali deal alone 
breathe life into multilateral trade liberalisation and raise the prospect 
that the more ambitious aspects of Doha can be completed?
While the package of measures that formed the Bali deal were largely 
composed of those which were regarded as ‘most likely’ to be readily 
delivered, the negotiations still took over two years. The Bali agreement 
demonstrated how difficult it is to reach an outcome when working with 
159 countries, even on issues that are considered to be less contentious. 
WTO decisions are made on a consensus basis, meaning all members 
must agree on all elements of a package of measures, such that any 
one member can scuttle a whole deal by not agreeing to one issue. For 
example, the Bali deal, and the future of the WTO, nearly came unstuck 
at the last minute over India’s refusal to accept some of the agricultural 
aspects of the agreement, as well as Cuba’s objection to the removal of 
a reference to the US trade embargo on Cuba.
There was a degree of enthusiasm following the Bali deal, with the 
view that it was a stepping stone to the completion of the Doha Round. 
But given the experience of the negotiations to date and the outcome 
at Bali, it is difficult to see how the ambitious elements of Doha will be 
9 Alan S. Alexandroff, “The Fear of Fragmentation.”
10 Peter Draper, “Strengthening Global Trade Liberalisation: Enhancing the G20’s Role,” in 
Think20 Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike 
Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
11 Ibid.
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agreed. Changes are needed to the way multilateral negotiations are 
conducted within the WTO, and the WTO has to move on from the 
Doha Round.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
PUT TRADE AT THE CENTRE OF THE G20 GROWTH AGENDA
A major priority for the G20 in 2014 should be to truly embrace the 
importance of trade openness and the multilateral trading system to 
global growth and development. Trade ought not to be considered 
as but one item on a crowded G20 agenda, nor one that is primarily 
the responsibility of trade ministers. International trade belongs at the 
centre of the G20’s agenda on growth.12 It should form the core of the 
comprehensive growth strategies that leaders requested be prepared 
by finance ministers for presentation at the Brisbane Summit.
As part of embracing the importance of trade to growth, G20 leaders 
should aim to provide strategic guidance on the future of the multilateral 
trading system. The trade ministers in Bali called on WTO negotiators 
to use the next twelve months to draft a work plan for the future. As 
noted, however, major changes are required if substantial progress on 
multilateral liberalisation is to be achieved. The G20 is not the place 
to attempt to do the detailed work of the WTO. But it is the place to 
provide strategic political direction on the future of the global trading 
system. Towards this end, there are a number of specific steps the G20 
could take at the Brisbane Summit to demonstrate the importance its 
members place on maintaining and expanding open markets.
STRENGTHEN THE STANDSTILL ON PROTECTIONIST 
MEASURES
As noted, the standstill on protectionism is one of the more significant 
agreements reached by the G20. Moreover, that the main focus of any 
discussion on trade issues at G20 summits has been on whether to 
extend the standstill and for how long, shows that these discussions 
have sometimes been contentious. However the focus at the Brisbane 
Summit should not be on whether to extend the standstill, but on how 
it could be strengthened. The inter-agency effort aimed at evaluating 
the compliance of G20 members with the standstill agreement should 
not only be continued – it should also be given greater publicity.13 In 
particular, the latest report should be directly discussed at the G20 
summit, and the leaders’ communiqué should include a reference as 
to how G20 members are responding to the latest report on their trade 
measures. This could include the establishment of a peer review process 
within the G20 to monitor adherence to the standstill commitment.14 
12 Ivan T.M Oliveira, “The G20 Trade Agenda: Proposals for the Australian Presidency,” ibid.
13 Peter Draper, “Strengthening Global Trade Liberalisation: Enhancing the G20’s Role.”
14 Ivan T.M Oliveira, “The G20 Trade Agenda: Proposals for the Australian Presidency.”
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The monitoring should also cover non-tariff measures, or what is called 
‘murky protectionism’. In addition, specific attention should be given 
to monitoring the commitment to roll back protectionist measures that 
have been introduced since the crisis.15 
SET A STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR DOHA, BALI AND BEYOND
The G20 should go beyond providing pro forma statements on trade 
in communiqués and provide genuine political commitment to finally 
‘conclude’ the Doha Round and to start focusing on the future of the 
multilateral trading system and the WTO post-Doha.16 The momentum 
achieved with the Bali agreement should not be lost, and the G20 could 
build on it by explicitly calling on WTO trade ministers to identify another 
set of development-focused deliverables from the Doha agenda. 
With the leaders’ endorsement, trade ministers should commit to the 
speedy negotiation of this ‘newer’ package, with the explicit objective 
of concluding the Doha Round so that they can start to consider the 
post-Doha world. Negotiations in the post-Doha world should avoid 
repeating the WTO’s ambitious and wide-ranging agendas with a single 
undertaking of the past, where ‘nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed’. Negotiations should instead target specific areas and allow for 
plurilateral agreements that allow WTO members to opt in, such as the 
Information Technology Agreement, International Services Agreement, 
and Government Procurement Agreement.17 
The discussions over the future of the WTO should be anchored 
around the governance of global value chains and their implications for 
international trade negotiations. As Suparna Karmaka has pointed out, 
“the new trade liberalisation agenda should recognise the centrality of 
global value chain production and trade patterns when (re)designing 
global trade governance rules in order to reflect new business models 
and trade trends”.18 When contrasted with the negative effects of 
divergent and complex ‘rules of origin’ present in regional agreements, 
multilateral negotiations are more effective and beneficial in facilitating 
trade when global value chains are properly accounted for. An example 
of how global value chains are altering traditional thinking around trade 
policy can be found in the recent EU-China solar panel anti-dumping 
case. Given the interdependence and intra-sectoral trade in the solar 
industries in the disputing countries, there was little industry support 
for the introduction of trade-restrictive measures in response to alleged 
anti-competitive behaviour by Chinese exporters.19 Specific attention 
15 Peter Draper, “Strengthening Global Trade Liberalisation: Enhancing the G20’s Role.”
16 Ivan T.M Oliveira, “The G20 Trade Agenda: Proposals for the Australian Presidency.”
17 Yong Wang, “The G20’s Role in Addressing the WTO’s Predicament: Seeking Political 
Compromise and Strengthening the Multilateral Trading System,” in Think20 Papers 
2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and 
Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
18 Suparna Karmakar, “Life after Bali: Renewing the World Trade Negotiating Agenda,” 
Bruegel Policy Contribution December, 2013/17(2013).
19 Ibid.
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also needs to be devoted to the needs of developing countries in 
relation to plugging into global value chains as well as upgrading within 
global value chains.20 This should be an important aspect of the G20’s 
efforts at supporting development.
Consideration of the implications of global value chains needs to be 
elevated beyond discussions between trade officials and trade ministers 
and should be a key item on the agenda for G20 sherpas and leaders. 
The St Petersburg leaders’ declaration calls on the OECD to deliver a 
report on global value chains by mid-2014. However the OECD and 
WTO have already completed a number of reports on global value 
chains. The G20 needs to move beyond just calling on international 
organisations to prepare reports and instead needs to seriously pursue 
the full implications of global value chains for trade policy and trade 
negotiations. In order to elevate the consideration of this issue, a G20 
leader(s) could be asked to prepare an assessment of global value 
chains for consideration by their fellow leaders at the Brisbane Summit.
MULTILATERAL TRADE AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
As noted, there is a concern that the current partiality towards regional 
trade agreements is a threat to multilateral trade liberalisation. However, 
because the main proponents of regional agreements are members 
of the G20, it is important that they make every effort to deliver on the 
commitment in the St Petersburg declaration that “we commit to ensure 
that regional trade agreements support the multilateral trading scheme”.21 
The G20 must work hard to bring more transparency to regional 
agreements by implementing the actions outlined in the document 
Advancing Transparency in Regional Trade Agreements which was 
released at the St Petersburg Summit. Information sharing is not taking 
place so far.22 Specific steps should be taken to monitor whether G20 
members are honouring this commitment and a report on compliance 
should be submitted for consideration at the Brisbane Summit. A G20 
working group should be established to define concrete mechanisms 
for monitoring and reviewing regional trade agreements in the WTO 
(based on the model of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism).23 The 
G20 should also support the introduction of some consistency into the 
rules that form the basis of the regional agreements. For example, 
rules covering country of origin and technical and health standards 
potentially risk discriminating against countries that are not involved 
in the regional agreements, which is regrettable, as these are mainly 
developing countries.24 Introducing some consistency into these areas 
20 Peter Draper, “Strengthening Global Trade Liberalisation: Enhancing the G20’s Role.”
21 G20, “G20 Leaders’ Declaration, St Petersburg,” http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-
0906-declaration.html.
22 Shinichi Kitajima, “Toward More Open International Trade: The G20’s Responsibility.”
23 Ivan T.M Oliveira, “The G20 Trade Agenda: Proposals for the Australian Presidency.”
24 Ibid.
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25 Alan S. Alexandroff, “The Fear of Fragmentation.”
26 Peter Draper, “Strengthening Global Trade Liberalisation: Enhancing the G20’s Role.”
might include the establishment of an independent process to develop 
model clauses that could be incorporated into regional agreements.25 
A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT – AT SOME STAGE?
Investment is governed haphazardly at the multilateral level. There 
are thousands of international investment agreements, both bilateral 
and plurilateral. Many of the regional trade agreements currently being 
negotiated include investment protection agreements. The attempt to 
pursue a Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) through the OECD 
in the mid-1990s was very controversial and ultimately not successful. 
A draft MIA was severely criticised by civil society, which argued that 
excessive protection of foreign investors would be to the detriment of 
host governments, particularly in developing countries.
The absence of a more coordinated approach to establishing a 
multilateral investment regime has arguably not impeded the growth of 
foreign direct investment around the world. Moreover, while the WTO 
appears the logical place to advance the negotiation of a multilateral 
investment agreement, its lack of progress on the trade front suggests 
it might not be the best launching pad for a new set of negotiations. In 
addition, the immediate priority for the WTO should be on concluding 
and moving on from the Doha Round. Nevertheless, if G20 leaders are 
to look to the future, and in particular the future of the WTO, they should 
initiate a serious discussion of the future of multilateral investment 
governance under the oversight of the WTO.26  
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THE G20 AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE
DANIELA STRUBE1 
INTRODUCTION
The Australian G20 presidency has indicated that infrastructure will be 
a priority of the G20 in 2014. There is a significant global infrastructure 
gap – McKinsey estimates that in the period to 2030, USD 57 trillion 
or 3.5 per cent of global GDP will have to be devoted to infrastructure 
just to support projected GDP growth, otherwise growth will be stifled.2 
This is almost 60 per cent more than the USD 36 trillion that has been 
spent on infrastructure globally since 1995.3 OECD estimates are 
similar, which suggest USD 50 trillion is needed to maintain current 
growth rates, as well as an additional USD 45 trillion if climate change 
adaptation and mitigation targets for 2050 are to be met.4  
CHALLENGES
Due to the need for higher growth after the global financial crisis, 
infrastructure investment has received a great deal of attention from 
policy-makers. In particular, it is seen as a way of lifting economic 
demand and activity in the short term. While this renewed focus on 
infrastructure is a positive development given the global infrastructure 
shortfall, this general enthusiasm needs to be met with a sense of 
caution, and an objective and critical mindset. A few key challenges to 
improving infrastructure investment are discussed in this paper.
TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO 
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING
Infrastructure investment decisions are highly complex. Because of their 
large scale, long life, and illiquid nature, infrastructure projects contain 
a large degree of unpredictability. This complicates ex ante policy 
evaluations, because they rely upon assessments on the future state of 
an uncertain world. Particular risks associated with infrastructure include 
environmental and climate risks, technology risk, and regulatory risk. 
Project appraisals that fail to capture important information often result 
in ‘white elephants’ – costly projects that are unfit for the purpose, and 
that ultimately turn into a liability for the investor(s) and the community.
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Matter?,” IMF Working Paper 12/277(2012).
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7 IMF, “World Economic Outlook October 2013: Transitions and Tensions,” (Washington 
DC, 2013).
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9 Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute, “Connecting South 
Asia and Southeast Asia: Interim Report,” (Tokyo, 2013); Sarp Kalkan, “Connectivity 
Matters for the G20,” in Think20 Papers 2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane 
G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2013).
In addition to these technical challenges, infrastructure investment 
decisions are intrinsically political. Infrastructure tends to be popular 
among politicians, because a bridge or a road represents an immediate 
and tangible output for the money that is spent. However, investing in 
infrastructure typically means committing very large amounts of (public) 
money to a project intended for public use for years, if not decades 
or even centuries to come. Naturally, key stakeholders have a vested 
interest in influencing the design and financing of such a project. Ideally, 
though, infrastructure investment should not be seen as a policy end in 
itself, but rather a means to promote long-term growth and prosperity 
among the community.
DIFFERENT COUNTRIES – DIFFERENT CHALLENGES
Although infrastructure gaps are apparent in many countries, there are 
inevitably other policy areas competing for the attention of leaders. 
Furthermore, countries with infrastructure gaps do not necessarily 
have them for the same reasons, meaning it may not be appropriate 
for all G20 countries to commit significant amounts of government 
resources to infrastructure investment, not least at the expense of 
other more pressing policy areas. China, for example, is currently 
attempting to transition from an investment-led to a consumption-
based economy. China analysts increasingly worry about the risk 
of overinvestment in China and associated negative externalities.5 
Similarly, other advanced economies, such as Japan and parts of 
Europe, are relatively oversaturated in terms of infrastructure supply.6 
Essentially, just as the critical obstacles to growth vary from country to 
country, there is likely to be a need for an equally diverse and country-
specific set of policy responses. 
Emerging and developing countries are, and will continue to be, driving 
forces of global economic growth in the twenty-first century.7 However, 
a large part of the global infrastructure gap concerns emerging and 
developing countries, and is therefore worthy of G20 attention.8 
The global infrastructure agenda should be repurposed to adapt to 
this reality, for example by prioritising the extension of South-South 
transit routes. Large aggregate efficiency gains can be expected 
from facilitating South-South trade.9 Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) are particularly well placed to promote a South-South 
connectivity agenda.
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Nevertheless, although the infrastructure needs of emerging and 
developing countries are pronounced, raising the funds for investment 
in these countries has, historically, proven to be a challenge. However, 
the issue has not been a matter of locating capital, so much as trying to 
shift the preference of large savings available in emerging economies 
towards productive infrastructure investment projects outside of the 
developed world.10 Emerging market investors still seem to prefer 
established, advanced markets, while portfolio managers in developed 
countries have demonstrated a similar reluctance to explore emerging 
economy opportunities on a large scale. At least part of the underlying 
problem that motivates this biased investment behaviour is insufficient 
market depth, particularly in local currency markets, but also more 
generally in emerging and developing countries.11 The G20 has already 
taken steps towards promoting local currency bond markets (LCBMs) by 
commissioning the development of a Common Diagnostic Framework 
(CDF) on LCBMs. However, follow-up on the CDF has been weak. It 
has not been a G20 policy priority.
HOW TO INCLUDE THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Leveraging private funds for socially important infrastructure projects is 
desirable. However, exactly how and to what extent infrastructure policy 
should focus on increasing private sector participation is contentious. 
For a long time, public-private partnerships (PPPs) seemed to be the 
answer to the chronic shortage of infrastructure financing. But the last 
few decades have produced mixed evidence on PPPs, and experts 
have become increasingly sceptical of their value, warning against a 
‘PPP bias’.12  
PPPs are highly complex instruments. Many governments, not only in 
developing countries, lack the capacity to effectively deal with PPPs.13 
On top of the usual administrative burden associated with infrastructure 
investment, PPPs bring the added problem of ‘moral hazard’, whereby 
downside risks are generally implicitly borne by the public party, not the 
10 Stephen Grenville, “Financing for Infrastructure − What Contribution Can the G20 
Make?,” in G20 Monitor No.6: Infrastructure, Anti-Corruption, Energy and the G20 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
11 Maria Monica Wihardja, “Infrastructure Development: The Role of East Asian Regional 
Institutions in Managing Capital Flows through Financial Deepening,” in Think20 Papers 
2014: Policy Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit, ed. Mike Callaghan and 
Hugh Jorgensen (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
12 Clive Harris, Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Trends, 
Impacts, and Policy Lessons (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2003); Antonio 
Estache and Caroline Philippe, “The Impact of Private Participation in Infrastructure in 
Developing Countries: Taking Stock of About 20 Years of Experience,” ECARES working 
paper 2012-043 (2012); OECD and International Transport Forum, “Better Regulation of 
Public-Private Partnerships for Transport Infrastructure: Summary and Conclusions,” ITF 
Round Tables, No. 151(2013).
13 Grenville, “Financing for Infrastructure − What Contribution Can the G20 Make?”; 
Maria Monica Wihardja, “Looking at G20 Initiatives on Infrastructure Investment from a 
Developing Country’s Perspective: Indonesia,” in G20 Monitor No.6: Tax, Infrastructure, 
Anti-Corruption, Energy and the G20 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013).
23
POLICY IDEAS FOR THE BRISBANE G20 SUMMIT: REFLECTIONS ON THINK20 2014G20 MONITOR
14 See for example Dennis De Clerck, Erik Demeulemeester, and Willy Herroelen, “Public 
Private Partnerships: Look before You Leap into Marriage,” Review of Business and 
Economic Literature 57, no. 3 (2012).
15 McKinsey Global Institute, “Infrastructure Productivity: How to Save $1 Trillion a Year.”
private investor.14 Again, the G20 has a role to play here in providing 
guidance on how to effectively include the private sector in meeting the 
global infrastructure challenge.
INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE NON-ECONOMIC 
DIMENSIONS OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
In addition to economic importance, infrastructure projects have 
enormous social, environmental, and governance implications. 
Infrastructure is a quasi-public good. Pure public goods are non-rival and 
non-excludable. Non-excludability means that no one can be excluded 
from using the good or service. User fees and access restrictions make 
it possible to exclude people from using the good or service provided 
by many types of infrastructure. Non-rivalry requires that the benefits 
from using a good or service do not diminish with an increasing number 
of users. This is generally not the case for infrastructure either, since 
the expanded use of roads leads to congestion, as is the case for 
electricity networks. However, it is precisely the task of governments 
to ensure all citizens and companies can benefit from essential 
services. In addition, infrastructure produces external effects that may 
result in disproportionate (or unintended) benefits accruing to some 
stakeholders, such as for landowners whose land values are elevated 
due to better connectivity courtesy of infrastructure investment in the 
area. The social dimension of infrastructure involves making sure 
that the benefits from infrastructure projects are fairly shared among 
investors and the wider community. 
Infrastructure projects typically also have an environmental impact, 
both in the immediate construction stage, and later on in the utilisation 
phase. Because infrastructure projects are typically long-term in nature, 
it is important to avoid locking in unsustainable technologies that may 
exacerbate the environmental footprint of the community for a long 
time. Therefore, infrastructure projects need to be as forward-looking 
and technologically advanced as possible. 
In a similar vein, it is important to avoid a bias toward expanding 
infrastructure supply. Improving the productivity of existing 
infrastructure can yield large benefits, and often may be more cost-
effective and environmentally sustainable than traditional supply-
side measures.15 Moreover, infrastructure investment also involves 
important opportunities to positively contribute to environmental policy 
goals, provided environmental and climate objectives are appropriately 
integrated into project appraisal. 
Finally, sound governance is a critical factor in the success of 
infrastructure investment. Regulatory risk is in fact one of the major 
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concerns of investors considering infrastructure investment, especially 
in developing and emerging countries.16 Similarly, governance problems 
are another issue that private sector investors must take into account 
before investing in PPP arrangements. In fact, making progress on the 
transparency aspect of infrastructure investment may not only improve 
project performance, but also contribute to advancing the broader 
governance agenda.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Defining an appropriate role for the G20 in promoting infrastructure 
investment is a crucial, and often overlooked, first step. The first question 
for the G20 should be where or whether it can actually add value to 
the efforts of international organisations and individual countries in 
facilitating increased infrastructure investment. 
AN INTEGRATED VIEW OF INFRASTRUCTURE AS A 
DETERMINANT OF GROWTH
The G20 should stress that the objective of infrastructure policy should 
not be dominated by short-term considerations, such as immediately 
boosting economic activity. While such an outcome is obviously 
welcome, it should not be the sole or primary motivation for undertaking 
a particular infrastructure project. Rather, the G20 should commit to a 
more strategic and long-term perspective on infrastructure investment. In 
terms of enhancing growth potential, infrastructure issues should also not 
be considered in isolation from the wider G20 ‘growth and jobs’ agenda. 
To achieve this, the Infrastructure and Investment Working Group needs 
to work closely with the finance track and the Framework Working Group. 
In particular, any G20 initiative on infrastructure investment should be 
tightly embedded in the ‘coordinated growth strategies’ that are to be 
presented at the Brisbane Summit. These growth strategies should 
clearly outline how infrastructure investment is expected to contribute to 
fostering strong, sustainable and balanced growth.
QUALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING 
The G20’s role in terms of promoting infrastructure investment should 
be about setting the ‘big picture’ strategy. This requires, among other 
things, updating the way government spending is accounted for. The 
fiscal repercussions of the global financial crisis have reinforced a 
pessimistic view of government spending, such that it has come to 
be treated by political leaders as a necessary evil, that is to be kept 
at bay. In the context of promoting infrastructure investment, the G20 
can promote a differentiated view of public spending and contribute to 
a more balanced assessment of productive investment. One way to 
16 World Bank, “Long-Term Financing of Infrastructure: A Look at Non-Financial Constraints 
− Issue Note (No.6) for Consideration by G20,” http://ru.g20russia.ru/load/781245867.
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facilitate this would be to single out the investment (capital) component 
of the budget and separate it from general government expenses 
(operations account).17  
Carefully designed and high-quality infrastructure investment may 
offer a responsible avenue out of the strict austerity mind-set that 
still dominates public policy in many countries. Infrastructure projects 
typically create substantial ancillary demand in the construction phase. 
Sound infrastructure projects also represent a productive asset that 
may generate positive productivity spillovers on local and regional 
business activity that can contribute to facilitating a demand-led exit 
from the depressed growth of the last few years. 
AVOID ‘ONE SIZE FITS ALL’ APPROACHES
The causes of infrastructure gaps and barriers to investment vary among 
countries. The G20 needs to resist the temptation to come out with ‘one 
size fits all’ solutions for infrastructure investment. Before infrastructure 
investment is elevated to a policy priority, the extent to which increased 
infrastructure spending is required and the impediments that need to 
be addressed in order to facilitate such investment need to be properly 
evaluated, separately for every G20 country and also vis-à-vis other 
policy areas.
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION SHOULD NOT BE AN END 
IN ITSELF
Increased private sector participation in infrastructure spending should 
not be an objective in itself. While promoting the private sector may 
produce a number of positive policy externalities, the overall objective 
of getting the best value for (taxpayers’) money should prevail. The 
G20 should promote a value-for-money approach to identifying funding 
sources.18 PPPs will continue to play a role in infrastructure investment 
where it is sensible to do so. But PPPs should not be seen as the 
default choice per se, but one of several possible alternatives. 
THE ROLE OF MDBS NEEDS TO BE REDEFINED 
As a leader-centred forum that is at least broadly regionally 
representative, the G20 is well placed to push for a broad review of 
the role of international organisations, and in particular MDBs, in global 
governance. Although this goes beyond the immediate infrastructure 
agenda, in terms of their specific role in addressing the investment 
challenge, the G20 can provide strategic direction to the MDBs to 
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enhance their ability to deliver on their infrastructure commitments. 
While increasing the funding available to MDBs would likely strengthen 
their capacity to deliver financial assistance to infrastructure projects, 
resource commitments may be hard to obtain from many G20 members 
due to the protracted recovery from the global financial crisis. However, 
there are several ways in which the G20 can support the technical role 
of MDBs in global infrastructure investment without necessarily making 
(substantial) new financial commitments.
First, the G20 should encourage the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) to step up their commitment to supporting emerging and 
developing countries in the deepening of their capital markets. A ‘re-
energising’ of the G20-MDBs work on LCBMs would be an important first 
step. In particular, the G20 countries should commit to supporting the 
implementation of the Common Diagnostic Framework on LCBMs, both 
in the G20’s emerging member countries and by offering assistance to 
non-G20 developing countries.19  
In addition to strengthening the enabling environment for infrastructure 
investment, MDBs also have a technical assistance role to play in 
selecting and managing infrastructure projects. One innovative avenue 
may lie in cooperating with credit rating agencies (CRAs), whereby the 
MDBs’ technical expertise is combined with the CRAs’ key position in 
the international financial architecture. MDB-CRA cooperation could 
strengthen project appraisals and make infrastructure investment more 
attractive to a range of institutional investors.20 
BETTER INTEGRATE SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
GOVERNANCE CONCERNS
Focusing on the ‘good governance’ of the entire infrastructure project 
cycle – from project appraisal to project design and from contract setup 
to project construction and maintenance – is particularly crucial for 
enhancing the productivity of infrastructure investment. The G20 can 
respond to this issue by encouraging the devolution of decision-making 
authority to those levels of government that are better equipped to 
efficiently deal with infrastructure project management. However, the 
key factor in improving infrastructure governance is transparency, and 
the G20 countries can play a role in this area by providing ‘leadership 
by example’.
Finally, infrastructure policy must be about more than building new 
roads and bridges. G20 members should commit to attaching at least 
as much priority to improving the productivity of existing infrastructure 
as on expanding supply. Better infrastructure management through 
demand-side policies should be an integral element of any G20 
19 IMF et al., “Local Currency Bond Markets − a Diagnostic Framework,” (2013).
20 Stephen Grenville, “Infrastructure and G20,” in Words into Action: G20 Brisbane 2014 
(Australian Institute for International Affairs, 2014, forthcoming).
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infrastructure pledge at the Brisbane Summit. Demand-side policies 
go beyond congestion pricing and include non-price alternatives 
such as using traffic monitoring technologies to optimise capacity 
utilisation and minimise congestion.21 A demand-side and productivity-
maximising approach also opens up ample opportunities for integrating 
environmental and climate perspectives into infrastructure policy. 
The G20 can provide leadership in promoting the comprehensive 
integration of climate objectives into infrastructure projects as a viable 
option for achieving tangible progress in the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions.
CONCLUSION
From the analysis above, it is clear that fostering infrastructure 
investment entails significant opportunities for the global economy and 
that the G20 should be proactive in this area. However, infrastructure 
cannot be a remedy for every ailment, and a careful diagnosis of the 
issue is needed if the G20 is to ensure it produces an efficient and 
responsible implementation strategy that contributes to the wider 
objective of strong, sustainable and balanced growth.
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THE G20 AND DEVELOPMENT: 
GROWING A BACKBONE
HUGH JORGENSEN1 
INTRODUCTION
Coherent, catalytic and concise – these are three words that are rarely 
used to describe the G20’s development agenda. Despite its generally 
laudable commitments, the G20 has struggled to bridge the gap 
between articulating and actually implementing its stated development 
priorities. The 2013 chair of the G20’s Development Working Group 
(DWG), Andrei Bokarev, conceded publicly that “it is not always clear 
what [the] G20 is doing on the development front, what concrete 
steps and decisions have been taken [and] what particular results it 
has helped to achieve”.2 Having been likened by harsher critics to a 
primordial creature lacking in both teeth and spine,3 it is evidently time 
the G20’s development program grew a policy backbone, lest it become 
extinct, or worse, another irrelevant annual bureaucratic talk-shop, 
disconnected from the real concerns of G20 leaders. 
This is especially important in 2014, the penultimate year of preparation 
before world leaders convene to adopt the United Nations’ post-2015 
development agenda (the successor to the Millennium Development 
Goals – MDGs), and also the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of Parties in Paris 
(COP21) – where UNFCCC members will make a last-ditch attempt 
to ratify a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. Left solely to UN 
leadership, the post-2015 development agenda is in danger of becoming 
an ‘unfocused, unending and unattractive’ wishlist.’4 If the G20 wishes to 
‘value-add’ to the global development agenda, it should aim to facilitate 
a convergence between the major UN initiatives and its own primary 
objective of ‘strong, sustainable and balanced growth’, accompanied by 
‘concrete and time-bound’ commitments.5 But before the G20 outlines 
any ‘concrete’ commitments, it must ensure it has an appropriate 
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development strategy in place. This means it will have to recalibrate the 
way in which it engages with the development agenda, as well as pursue 
more compelling and consequential outcomes that are worthy of the time, 
attention and unique capacity of G20 leaders. In reflecting on the Think20 
2014 discussion on development, this paper provides some thoughts on 
how the G20’s development strategy might be refined, before concluding 
with some specific policy recommendations.
WHY THE G20 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY NEEDS 
A RETHINK
The G20 has at least outlined a handful of core objectives that, if 
fully realised, would represent a major ‘value-add’ to the broader 
development agenda. Most notably, in 2009, G20 members determined 
better development policies were not only desirable in their own 
right, but also had a potentially crucial role to play in boosting global 
aggregate demand in the wake of the recent financial crisis.6 While the 
G20 has dabbled in development issues since its inception in 1999 
(initially as a forum for finance ministers and central bank governors),7 
this commendable linkage of development policy with the G20’s overall 
plan for global economic recovery showed G20 members recognised 
the post-crisis need to deliberately build upon and move beyond the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Washington Consensus, 
respectively.8 The potential role of development as a ‘driver of global 
growth’ was formally recognised in the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 Summit’s 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth (FSSBG).9  
The ‘Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth’, a key 
outcome document from the 2010 Seoul G20 Summit, gave depth to 
this reconceptualisation of development through a ‘multi-year action 
plan’ (MYAP) composed of nine ‘pillars’. Distinguishing the G20’s 
primary role as a forum for economic cooperation, the first four pillars of 
the Seoul Development Consensus focus on key boosters of economic 
growth: infrastructure, human resource development, trade, and private 
investment and job creation. The next four pillars correspond with major 
threats to the economic resilience of low-income countries (LICs): 
financial inclusion, ‘growth with resilience’, food security, and domestic 
resource mobilisation. The ninth pillar of ‘knowledge sharing’ underlies 
the practicality of pursuing the previous eight in a holistic way, as well 
as the value of G20 members cooperating with one another in their 
respective implementation of the Seoul consensus. 
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However, in practice, the G20’s contribution to development has not 
lived up to the rhetoric. Although the Seoul pillars are all worthy in their 
own right, their abundance means that no G20 chair has managed, 
or even attempted, to comprehensively address them all. Indeed, G20 
chairs have, post-Seoul, chosen to focus on only a handful of these 
pillars at a time, or, in some cases, have chosen to further complicate 
matters by adding their own, as in 2012, when the Mexican hosts added 
a tenth pillar of ‘green growth’. 
The Mexican presidency also divided the responsibility for pursuing 
the aforementioned pillars between the sherpa and finance ‘streams’, 
resulting in an awkward policy formation process whereby finance 
officials are often left out of discussions on development issues that 
lie within their sphere of influence, and vice versa for development 
officials.10 Moreover, given that many of the G20’s development 
commitments touch on matters such as trade, infrastructure, agricultural 
development, tax, anti-corruption, and policies on commodity and food 
price volatility, their success clearly means ministerial representatives 
from a greater number of government departments need to be involved, 
than simply those that focus on development and aid.11  
The separation of certain development issues from the finance stream 
and the FSSBG also means they are no longer included within the G20’s 
main accountability process – the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP).12 
This further diminishes the G20’s claim to have devised an ‘inclusive’ 
global growth strategy that truly incorporates the development agenda 
into its post-crisis plan for economic recovery.13 Hence, while a lack of 
resource commitments has been identified as a major hindrance to 
the G20’s delivery of development policy,14 the annual variability of the 
G20’s development agenda has made it difficult for the DWG to present 
an especially compelling or coherent case to leaders for increasing 
development outlays over the long term, particularly given the post-
crisis political inclination of leaders towards economic austerity. 
Thus, although the G20 certainly ought to allocate resource outlays 
that are commensurate with its stated development objectives, there 
are two prior discernable political challenges that the G20 development 
stream should address if it is to even earn the continued interest of 
leaders, let alone obtain potential future financial endorsement for its 
recommendations. These are, first, improving the succinctness and 
political appeal of the G20’s development agenda from the perspective 
of leaders, and, second, distributing the responsibility for designing and 
implementing the G20’s development priorities to individuals or agencies 
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that actually have the authority and resources to implement them. In 
short, the G20’s work on development should become more integrated 
with the overall focus of the forum, and less of an afterthought.
PROMOTING A LEADER-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
As long as G20 summits provide an opportunity for leaders to directly 
engage with one another in strengthening the global economy, then the 
political incentive to participate in the process is strong. Conversely, the 
more the agenda comes to be perceived as a vessel for hot air, the less 
likely it is that leaders will want to attend. Accordingly, if the development 
component of the G20 agenda is to improve and not detract from the 
overall potency of the G20, an effort should be made to directly involve 
leaders in honing its design. 
This is not to say that leaders should be involved in negotiating the 
detail of development policies, rather, leaders should simply take a 
greater role in ensuring that the G20’s development agenda actually 
reflects their collective interests and unique capacities as the leaders 
of twenty ‘systemically significant economies’. For instance, a large 
proportion of the development section from the St Petersburg leaders’ 
communiqué (and previous communiqués) is filled with references to the 
establishment of ‘knowledge-sharing platforms’, best-practice ‘toolkits’, 
the commissioning or endorsement of various reports, and other such 
efforts that have been aptly described by Robin Davies as ‘busy work’. 
This kind of ‘busy work’ is best left to bureaucrats; development issues 
that warrant the involvement of leaders are those that are systemic, 
that have fallen through the institutional gaps of the global governance 
system, and that contribute to both global development and economic 
growth. It is unlikely that development policies that do not meet these 
criteria need to be elevated to the leaders’ level, or that they enhance 
the credibility of the G20 when they are. G20 leaders have a limited 
appetite as to how many issues they can meaningfully pursue.
As indicated earlier, the G20’s engagement with development could be 
made more coherent if Australia put an end to the awkward allocation 
of responsibility between the finance and sherpa streams (of note, 
the same logic also applies to many other areas of the G20 agenda). 
Although the St Petersburg Development Outlook (and communiqué) 
commits to “enhancing policy coordination across different G20 work 
streams in order to ensure greater impact on developing countries”, this 
will be difficult to achieve if the ‘silo mentality’ of the current ‘inherited 
preparatory system’ is kept in place. Ideally, in a more integrated process, 
leaders would be able to work with their sherpas to ensure all ministers 
with a portfolio responsibility that was pertinent to a development 
objective would be part of the discussion. This can be highlighted with 
the example of food security, which is an issue that realistically lies 
within the jurisdiction of up to six ministries: “agriculture (subsidies), 
energy (biofuel policies), finance (regulation of derivatives markets and 
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investment), public works (rural infrastructure), welfare (safety nets) 
and science (research)”.15 Until the DWG is able to draw upon all of 
the necessary policy instruments in formulating its recommendations 
to leaders, the decline in the seniority of civil servants who attend its 
meetings will likely persist.16 
By way of ensuring leaders take a greater personal ownership of – and 
interest in – the G20 development agenda, it has been proposed that 
the Australian prime minister, in his capacity as the 2014 G20 chair, 
invite a selection of leaders to directly present a report to their fellow 
G20 leaders on a pressing systemic issue in need of political support 
from the G20. Some of the areas suggested for such reports include:17 
•  “Domestic Resource Mobilisation: invite the United States and 
China to prepare a joint proposal for international cooperative tax 
arrangements to deal with tax evasion, money laundering and 
corrupt practices”
•  “Financial Inclusion: invite India and Mexico to jointly present options 
for new institutional arrangements, such as a ‘Global Microfinance 
Facility’ in the World Bank Group to lever new Official Development 
Assistant (ODA) commitments and private sector investment in the 
microfinance sector”
The hope is that leaders would have a greater political or diplomatic 
incentive to realise a particular objective if their name was on the 
original plan underlying the commitment, or if it came from a fellow 
leader and was not merely a case of ‘rubber-stamping’ a suggestion 
from a meeting of officials.
Before concluding with an outline of specific development policy 
recommendations for the G20 agenda, it is worth noting that if the G20 
is to establish credibility as a development actor, it also needs to be 
more accountable to its commitments. Even if G20 leaders are able to 
bring about a more integrated and coherent agenda, this will only matter 
in so far as they can deliver in practice. Hence, if development is to play 
a part in the ‘coordinated G20 growth strategy’ – set to be delivered in 
Brisbane and discussed in an earlier section – then the 2010 decision 
to separate the G20’s work on development from the FSSBG and the 
MAP should be reversed. Although not without its problems, the MAP 
is at least preferable to conducting an accountability assessment of the 
DWG’s work program without reference to the rest of the G20 agenda, 
not least because the G20’s work on development was initially conceived 
as one of five key pillars within the FSSBG. This would hopefully 
lead to more ‘rounded’ development accountability reports than that 
delivered at St Petersburg; although the notion was worthy, the Saint 
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Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments 
only presented “the results of the implementation of the Seoul summit 
decisions, omitting those of the previous leaders’ meetings”.18 The St 
Petersburg report also did not review the individual performances of 
G20 members, and instead offered a more generalised account that 
leaves even the MAP looking superior as an accountability measure.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
ESTABLISH A ‘G20 2015 STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE GROUP’
The G20’s primary development goal, under Australia’s presidency, 
should be to strengthen the links between the major, but currently 
uncoordinated, development processes underway in 2014/15. These 
include the G20’s own FSSBG, UNFCCC COP21, the post-2015 
MDGs, and the UN’s sustainable development agenda. By establishing 
a strategic convergence group, the G20 could ‘assist upstream’ to 
these processes by “shaping coherent, convergent outcomes”.19 
Although many of these processes share common objectives, they 
are being coordinated by officials from different ministries who would 
benefit from an overarching narrative and strategic leadership that is 
within the capacity of the G20. It would certainly be a test of the G20’s 
‘global leadership’ ability. But tightening the post-2015 international 
development agenda, giving it political heft, and ensuring that practical 
targets were delegated to the appropriate set of ministries (not just 
development agencies) would all be feathers in the G20’s cap.
INVOLVE LICS IN ANY CHANGES TO THE MANDATE OF THE IFIS 
AND MDBS 
The existence of a development component within the G20 agenda 
reflects the recognition among G20 members that ‘strong, sustainable 
and balanced growth’ is only achievable if it is available to all countries, 
not just major rich or developing economies. The G20 should assess the 
mandate and resources of the major development agencies and banks 
and whether they are appropriately equipped to assist LICs in pursuing 
the kinds of policies that are espoused within the broader G20 agenda. 
For example, unless LICs can access the required level of technical 
assistance to meaningfully implement the tax reforms and tax-sharing 
arrangements that are espoused within the OECD’s recommendations 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), and that are necessary to 
properly implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
or to utilise the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, then due to regulatory 
arbitrage, these initiatives will ultimately languish. 
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The same logic also applies to the Australian Government’s special 
interest in pursuing an infrastructure financing agenda. The hurdles to 
long-term infrastructure investment in LICs (not least those in Southeast 
Asia) are starkly different from those in developed and developing 
economies, and require significant MDB assistance in areas like liquidity 
market deepening, infrastructure project selection, and assessing the 
suitability of projects for public-private partnership financing. 
Hence, before pursuing increases in ODA and funding for the IFIs and 
MDBs, if the G20 is to credibly claim a role as a forum that works for 
all countries and not just its own members, it needs to work with LICs 
in providing strategic guidance for, and applying pressure upon, the 
major IFIs and development agencies to set targets that align with the 
principles of the FSSBG, and that incorporate the particular needs and 
interests of LICs.20  
Of note, the G20 also has a strong opportunity in 2014 to push forward 
the G20’s commitment to lowering the cost of remittance transfers 
between countries. Given this is the only G20 commitment to have 
ever been accompanied by a set numerical target (in 2011, leaders 
committed to a reduction of 5 per cent by 2014), this would be a 
welcome result for LICs.21 
DO SOMETHING ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change cannot be left off the G20 agenda. It has been 
referenced at every G20 leaders’ summit since the inaugural meeting 
in Washington, and there are few pressing globally systemic issues 
more in need of guidance from G20 leaders.22 Although the G20 should 
not seek to do the work of the UNFCCC, the proximity of the Brisbane 
Summit to COP21 in Paris, where UNFCCC members will attempt to 
design a successor to Kyoto, means that leaders will be again expected 
to advance discussions on climate change in some form. That the 
November Brisbane Summit is wedged between the September 2014 
Climate Summit, organised by the UN Secretary-General, and the 
December UNFCCC COP20 in Peru, will intensify the political pressure 
on G20 leaders to make progress in Brisbane. To not do so will risk 
damaging the G20’s credibility as a global governance actor.
There are a handful of actions that the G20 could take in this area. For 
example, one of the more surprising outcomes from the St Petersburg 
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Summit was an initiative led by China and the United States to reduce 
the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs – super 
greenhouse gases) in line with the Montreal Protocol. At Brisbane, the 
G20 should look to advance discussions on climate change financing. 
While Brisbane is not the place to seek an agreement on this issue, if 
leaders were to engage in serious discussion about how best to raise 
funding – drawing upon the numerous major reports that have been 
previously commissioned on the topic – and also how the money might 
best be spent, this would be a welcome step forward in advance of the 
COP21 negotiations in Paris.23  
Leaders could also boost the momentum of the preparations for the 
Paris negotiations by committing to attend the meeting, although 
this would obviously be contingent on whether they have anything 
meaningful to say. Given that the atmosphere is itself a global public 
good, leaders might also look at their domestic environmental policies, 
such as vehicle fuel efficiency standards and fossil fuel subsidies, and 
whether these are calibrated to provide the right incentives in terms of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.24 
CONCLUSION
The G20’s work on development is arguably one of the most publicly 
accessible components of the forum’s agenda. For the general public, 
and those uninitiated in the technocracy of global governance and how 
it connects to reality, mainstay G20 issues like strengthening global 
financial regulation, enhancing the role and mandate of the major 
multilateral institutions, and even the objectives of the FSSBG itself 
are either opaque, or at best, abstract objectives. For many, it is large, 
tangible, and visible challenges such as poverty, global (and domestic) 
income inequality, the effects of climate change, or even smaller day-to-
day issues like the high cost of remittances, that can serve as a point of 
entry for discussions around the role and purpose of the G20. For the 
G20 to retain any influence, political leaders have to be able to bridge 
its work, much of it important and high-level, with the expectations of 
their own citizenry. Value-adding to the global development agenda 
in the ways described in this paper would hopefully galvanise public 
support for the G20, and strengthen its future as a politically workable 
and relevant process. It is in the interests of the G20, and Australia as 
its president, that it does so.
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